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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Plaintiff-Appellant Aurora Credit Services, Inc. (wCAurora" or "Appellant") appeals
from the trial court's September 19, 2006 Final Judgment against it and in favor of
Defendants-Appellees Liberty West Development, Inc. ("Liberty West"), XM
International ("XM") and Dennis W. Gay ("Mr. Gay") (collectively, "Defendants"). In
particular, Aurora appeals the portion of the Final Judgment awarding trial court costs to
Defendants pursuant to Utah Rule of Procedure 54. See R. at 3413-15. Aurora timely
filed its Notice of Appeal on October 19, 2006. See R. at 3416-18. The Utah Court of
Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Defendants present the following statement of the issues and standards of review.1
1.

Did the trial court properly award trial court costs to Defendants in the

amount of $1,785.02?
a.

Standard of Review. Although the award of costs generally is a

matter within the trial court's discretion, Aurora correctly notes that, because it
challenges the propriety of the award under Rule 54(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, the correction of error standard of review applies in this instance. See Lyon v.
Burton, 2000 UT 19, ^ 76 & n.18, 5 P.3d 616; Brief of Appellant ("Appellant's Br.") at 1.
2.

Did the trial court properly reject Aurora's unreasonable request for the

imposition of Rule 11 sanctions in connection with Defendants' application for trial court

Defendants do not contest that each of the following issues was properly preserved for
appeal.
1

costs, particularly where the trial court granted Defendants' request over Aurora's formal,
written objection?
a.

Standard of Review. Whether a Rule 11 violation has occurred is a

question of law reviewed for correctness. See Jeschke v. Willis, 811 P.2d 202, 204 (Utah
Ct. App. 1991). However, a trial court's decision whether to impose sanctions under
Rule 11 is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 163,
171 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) ("We are mindful that Rule 11 gives trial courts great leeway to
tailor the sanction to fit the requirements of the particular case.").
3.

Should this Court deny Aurora's unsupported request for sanctions against

Defendants and their counsel under Rules 33, 34 and 40 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure?2
a.

Standard of Review. Because the decision whether to sanction a

party under the Rules of Appellate Procedure lies with this Court in the first instance, no
standard of review is applicable.
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
Rules 11 and 54 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rules 33 and 40 of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure are included as Exhibit "A" to the Addendum hereto.

2

Rule 34 is inapplicable to Aurora's request for sanctions. See Utah R. App. Proc. 34.
Thus, the text of the rule is not included in the Addendum hereto.
2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

NATURE OF THE CASE
Following Aurora's unsuccessful appeal to this Court, the denial of its Petition for

Rehearing, and the Utah Supreme Court's rejection of its Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
from the Utah Supreme Court, Aurora is back before the Court yet again. This time,
Aurora challenges the trial court's award of $1,785.02 in costs incurred by XM in
connection with the proceedings below.
According to Aurora, Defendants are not entitled to an award of their trial court
costs because, contrary to Rule 54(d)(2), they failed to submit a memorandum of costs
''within five days after the entry of judgment." Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2). Aurora also
mistakenly contends that, because Defendants' request for their trial court costs was in
u

bad faith," the trial court should have imposed sanctions on Defendants pursuant to Rule

11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Finally, Aurora seeks sanctions from this Court
pursuant to Rules 33 and 40 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Aurora's appeal should be rejected, and the trial court's rulings should be
affirmed. The trial court's award of costs to Defendants was correct in light of the plain
language of Rule 54(d), which easily can be read to support the submission of a
memorandum of costs after an appeal is completed, so long as the memorandum is
submitted within five days of the entry of the final judgment resolving the case.
The trial court also properly declined to assess Rule 11 sanctions against
Defendants. Indeed, in awarding costs to Defendants, the trial court itself accepted
Defendants' reading of Rule 54(d), which alone signifies that no Rule 11 violation
3

occurred. Further, Defendants' request for costs was based upon a logical and correct
reading of Rule 54(d). Although Utah case law generally provides that Rule 54(d)
requires the submission of a memorandum of costs within five days of the entry of a
judgment from which an appeal is taken, no Utah case has addressed the exact scenario
presented here, and both the plain language of Rule 54(d) and case law from other
jurisdictions support Defendants' reading. Thus, Defendants did not violate Rule 11, and
they certainly did not submit their memorandum of costs in bad faith.
Finally, this Court should decline to sanction Defendants under the Rules of
Appellate Procedure. Aurora is the appellant in this case, and Defendants are merel)
responding to Aurora's appeal. As such, the terms of Rules 33 and 40 are inapplicable.
In addition, Defendants' contentions were not frivolous, and Defendants have not made
any argument for any improper purpose. Thus, even if Aurora's request for sanctions
was proper, sanctions against Defendants are plainly unwarranted.
II.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW
This case has traveled through a lengthy and complex procedural history,

including an interlocutory appeal in 1998, see Aurora Credit Servs., Inc. v. Liberty West
Dev., Inc., 970 P.2d 1273 (Utah 1998) {"Aurora F), in which the Utah Supreme Court
reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to Defendants, concluding that the
trial court had erred in dismissing Aurora's direct shareholder claims and in granting
Defendant's motion for partial summary judgment on Aurora's derivative claims. See
Aurora /, 970 P.2d at 1282.

4

With respect to Aurora's derivative claims, the Utah Supreme Court held that,
although Aurora lacked standing to bring the derivative claims under the traditional
contemporaneous ownership doctrine, there were genuine issues of material fact as to
whether Aurora had standing by virtue of the "fraudulent concealment exception" to the
doctrine. See id. at 1279. Due to the factual nature of this inquiry, the Utah Supreme
Court remanded to the trial court for a determination of whether the fraudulent
concealment exception applied. See id. Because Aurora would only have standing if the
fraudulent concealment exception were satisfied, documents and evidence regarding
Defendants' representations to Aurora at and after the time when Aurora claims to have
become a shareholder of Liberty West became critically important to the case.
With respect to Aurora's direct claims, the court held that minority shareholders of
closely held corporations may proceed directly against corporate officers where the
shareholder suffered an injury "distinct from that suffered by the corporation." Id. at
1280. However, the court went on to hold that, just as with derivative actions, the
minority shareholder must meet the contemporaneous ownership standard of Rule 23.1.
See id. at 1280-81. Accordingly, the question on remand was the same as for the
derivative claims, namely, whether Aurora could pursue its direct claims based upon the
fraudulent concealment exception to the contemporaneous ownership rule. See id. at
1281. Thus, as with the derivative claims, documents and evidence regarding the
fraudulent concealment issue became vital.
Following remand, the parties recommenced their discovery efforts. See, e.g., R.
at 674, 696, 868. On October 19, 2001, Defendants again moved for summary judgment,
5

this time on the basis that Aurora had not met its burden to establish the fraudulent
concealment exception to the contemporaneous ownership rule. See R. at 1140. The
court denied the motion by Memorandum Decision and Order on August 1, 2002,
specifically emphasizing that summary judgment was inappropriate due to questions of
fact on the issue of "whether 'affirmative steps to conceal wrongdoing' from [Aurora]
were undertaken" between April 1993, when Aurora claims to have foreclosed on its
interest in Liberty West stock, and July 1993, when Aurora learned of a prior foreclosure
sale. SeeR. at 1304, 1306.
On December 4, 2002, in accordance with the court's denial of their motion for
summary judgment, Defendants served a second set of discovery requests (the "Second
Set of Requests"). See R. at 1384. Among other documents and information, the Second
Set of Requests formally sought certain information that Aurora's counsel had previously
promised but failed to provide to Defendants, including (1) handwritten notes taken by
Aurora's president, Charles N. Zak, of his conversations with Mr. Gay and others, which
Mr. Zak explicitly stated were in existence and his counsel promised to produce, albeit in
redacted form, at Mr. Zak's deposition on January 23, 2001, see R. at 1481, 1519, 153233; (2) a complete copy of Aurora's first set of document production, which Aurora's
counsel had also agreed to provide, see R. at 1480-81, 1519; and (3) a thorough
explanation of Aurora's claims, including identification and clarification of each claim
and the evidence supporting each claim, which Aurora also had previously promised to
provide. See R. at 1481, 1507-08. Incredibly, despite the prior agreements of Aurora's

6

counsel to produce the information, Aurora refused to produce the information in
response to the Second Set of Requests.
Defendants served the Second Set of Requests by mail on Aurora's counsel at
2258 South Wilshire Circle, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84109. See R. at 1383, 1385. As
Defendants later discovered, this address contained a single-digit typographical error the correct address is apparently 2558 South Wilshire Circle, Salt Lake City, Utah,
84109. Despite the error in the address, Aurora's counsel admitted that he received the
Second Set of Requests about one week after they were mailed to him, by approximately
December 11, 2003. See R. at 1569.
Defendants heard nothing from Aurora regarding the Second Set of Requests until
January 10, 2003 - four days after the due date - when Aurora's counsel informed
Defendants that Aurora did not intend to respond to the Second Set of Requests at all.
'See R. at 1478, 1524. Instead, Aurora planned to move to strike the Second Set of
Requests on the basis of a prior trial court order, which it claimed precluded Defendants
from conducting any further discovery. See id.
On January 14, 2003, having received no response to the Second Set of Requests,
Defendants moved to compel. See R. at 1534. As Defendants explained in the
memorandum supporting the motion, Aurora not only refused to respond to the Second
Set of Requests but also failed to file any objection to the requests and failed to move for
a protective order. See R. at 1476. Instead, on January 16, 2003, ten days after the
responses were due, Aurora filed a motion to strike the Second Set of Requests. Aurora
argued that a prior court order prohibited Defendants from conducting additional
7

discovery and that Defendants' decision to propound the requests was contrary to prior
representations made in the litigation. See R. at 1539. Aurora did not make any mention
of or otherwise refer to the service of the Second Set of Requests in its motion to strike.
In fact, Aurora did not raise this issue until January 27, 2003, when it filed its opposition
to the motion to compel and argued for the first time that it was not required to respond to
the Second Set of Requests because it was mailed to the wrong address. See R. at 1574.
The trial court held a hearing on Defendants' motion to compel and Aurora's
motion to strike, among other motions, on March 26, 2003, more than three months after
Defendants' service of the Second Set of Requests. See R. at 3347. Among other things,
the court considered and rejected the argument that the Second Set of Requests had been
improperly served. See R. at 3347, p. 32. The court further ruled as follows:
Here's what I'm going to do in this matter. I am going to allow
additional discovery by the defendants in this matter to the plaintiffs. I'm
also going to allow plaintiffs additional time in this matter. All discovery
in this case will be completed sixty days from today's date. Operative word
is completed, gentlemen. This case is almost as old as my children.
R. at 3347, pp. 33-34.
Defendants submitted a proposed order on these rulings, and Aurora
characteristically took the opportunity to re-argue its positions by objecting to the "form"
of the order. In reality, Aurora's objection was to the order's substance, not its form.
Among other things, Aurora claimed that the court did not grant Defendant's motion to
compel but instead simply stated that it would "allow additional discovery by
defendants." R. at 1713-14. The trial court rejected Aurora's objections and entered
Defendants' proposed order, with certain minor changes, on April 8, 2003:
8

Defendants' Motion to Compel is GRANTED, and Plaintiffs Motion to
Strike is DENIED. Plaintiff Aurora Credit Services, Inc. will respond to
Defendants' Second Set of Interrogatories to Plaintiff and Defendants'
Second Set of Requests for Production of Documents, within thirty (30)
days from April 18,2003.
R. at 1751. Although Defendants' original proposed order stated that Aurora must
respond to the Second Set of Requests within thirty days from the hearing date, i.e.,
March 26, 2003, the court scratched out that date and replaced it with April 18, 2003,
providing Aurora with about three additional weeks - through May 18, 2003 - to respond
to the Second Set of Requests. See R. at 1751. The court also imposed a deadline for the
completion of all discovery within sixty days from March 26, 2003. See R. at 1752.
Rather than simply complying with the April 8 Order by responding to the Second
Set of Requests by May 18, 2003, Aurora filed a flurry of other motions and papers. On
May 5, 2003, Aurora moved the court to appoint a special master to deal with the
discovery issues in the case. See R. at 1790. On May 12, 2003, Aurora moved for a
protective order to delay the deposition of Aurora's President, Charles F. Zak (uMr.
Zak"), which was then noticed for May 15, 2003. See R. at 1798. On the same day,
Aurora filed a document entitled "Motion to Toll Discovery Deadline for Period of
Special Master's Review of Discovery Issues and Request for Immediate Hearing," R. at
1803, asking the trial court to extend the sixty-day discovery period.
Aurora did serve a set of written responses to the Second Set of Requests on May
7, 2003. See R. at 1794-95. These "responses," however, provided extremely little
information in response to Defendants' interrogatories, and they refused to produce even
a single document, including the handwritten notes of Mr. Zak. See R. at 1936-1954.
9

Defendants filed a motion for Rule 37 sanctions on May 22, 2003. See R. at 1809,
arguing that Aurora's written responses were severely deficient and amounted to a
violation of the April 8 Order. Contrary to the express requirements of the Order, Aurora
had failed to produce Mr. Zak's handwritten notes, failed to provide a copy of its first set
of document production, and failed to identify or clarify its claims. See R. at 1915.
The hearing on the motion for sanctions did not occur until May 5, 2004, and,
although the briefing on each of Defendants' May 22, 2003 motions was finally
completed by February 6, 2004, see R. at 2134, Aurora failed to take advantage of the
interim period. Instead producing the requested documents, moving for an extension of
time, providing a privilege log, or moving for a protective order, for example, Aurora
filed yet another round of motions, including a forty-five page motion to strike an
affidavit, see R. at 2389, and a motion for partial summary judgment on the issues of
standing and liability for "various claims of plaintiff herein." R. at 2551. Following the
hearing, the trial court took the motion for sanctions under advisement. See R. at 2380.
On June 10, 2004, the court issued a minute entry imposing two sanctions on
Aurora for failing to comply with its Order and Defendants' discovery requests. See R. at
3261. First, due to its failure to produce the responsive information, Aurora would be
precluded from using or relying upon any testimony related to the alleged conversations
between Mr. Zak and Mr. Gay. See R. at 3261-62. Second, the court dismissed Aurora's
Second Amended Complaint, stating that Aurora had failed "to identify its claims and
evidence in support thereof." R. at 3262. Describing the basis for these sanctions, the
minute entry stated:
10

On April 8, 2003 this Court entered an Order granting defendants' Motion
to Compel and denying plaintiffs Motion to Strike. Consistent with its
Order, the court explicitly required plaintiff Aurora to respond to
defendants' second set of interrogatories and second set of requests for
production of documents within thirty (30) days, with discovery to be
completed in sixty (60) days. Plaintiff has failed to do so. To this day,
Aurora Credit has failed, in direct contravention of the Court's Order, to
provide defendants with basic documents and information crucial to its
defense of this case: the handwritten notes of Charles Zak regarding
conversations with James Hogle, Tony Versteeg and Lonnie Anderson,
relevant documents taken from Liberty West Development by a former
employee, and identification of and basis for the claims alleged.
R. at 3261 (emphasis added). Addressing the argument that Aurora adequately responded
to the Second Set of Requests by filing its "response" thereto on May 7, 2003, the court
stated:
While the Court recognizes that on May 7, 2003 Aurora served defendants
with "written responses", such responses were wholly inadequate.
Additionally, Aurora refused to produce the requested documentation
imperative to defendants' defense.
R. at 3261, n.l (emphasis added). An Order reflecting the findings and conclusions set
forth in the minute entry was entered on July 13, 2004. See R. at 3276.
In typical fashion, Aurora filed yet another motion to "alter or amend" following
the entry of the July 13, 2004 Order. See R. at 3280. On November 10, 2004, after the
motion had been fully briefed by the parties, the trial court denied Aurora's motion. See
R. at 3328-29. Aurora timely appealed from the trial court's denial of the motion to alter
or amend. See R. at 3331.
On February 16, 2006, this Court affirmed the trial court's entry of sanctions,
holding that "the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Aurora's second
amended complaint with prejudice pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(C)." See Aurora Credit
11

Servs., Inc. v. Liberty West Dev., Inc., 2006 UT App 48, \ 11, 129 P.3d 287. Aurora filed
a petition for rehearing, but the Court denied the petition on March 8, 2006. Aurora next
sought a writ of certiorari from the Utah Supreme Court, but that request was also denied.
See R. at 3361. This Court remitted the case to the trial court on June 2, 2006. See R. at
3350-51.
Following the Remittitur, Defendants submitted a Motion for Entry of Final
Judgment, a Verified Memorandum of Costs and a Verified Bill of Costs on Appeal. See
R. at 3372-94, 3368-71, and 3364-67, respectively. Aurora objected to each of
Defendants' filings, challenging both the propriety and amount of trial court costs sought
by Defendants, and the amount of costs sought by Defendants in connection with the
appeal. See R. at 3399-3404. Aurora also requested the trial court to issue Rule 11
sanctions against Defendants. See id. On September 19, 2006, the trial court rejected
Aurora's arguments and entered a Final Judgment, awarding Defendants $1,785.02 in
trial court costs and $322.32 in appellate costs. See R. at 3413-15. Aurora timely filed a
notice of appeal on October 19, 2006. See R. at 3416-18.
III.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendants Dennis Gay, James Hogle Jr. ("Mr. Hogle"), and two other individuals

formed Liberty West in 1986 for the purpose of developing commercial real estate. See
R. at 1156 f 3. Liberty West borrowed money to develop an office building in Ogden,
Utah (the "Ogden Property"), which was secured by a note and mortgage on the property.

Because the March 8, 2006 Order denying the Petition for Rehearing is not included in
the record, it is included in the Addendum hereto as Exhibit "B".
12

See R. at 1156 ^ 4-5. After construction of the property was completed, it was leased to
the Internal Revenue Service. See R. at 222 ^f 5.
In 1989, Liberty West was having financial difficulties, including being unable to
make the payments due on the Ogden Property, and numerous liens had been placed
against the Ogden Property. See R. at 1156 Tf 7. In early 1991, a creditor of Liberty West
named Restaurant Store & Equipment Supply Company, Inc. ("Restaurant Store") sued
Liberty West for nonpayment on a contract and obtained a monetary judgment against it.
See R. at 1157 ^ 11. Restaurant Store then obtained a Writ of Execution and, on April 24,
1991, the Weber County Sheriff recorded a levy on the Ogden Property with the Weber
County Recorder's Office. See R. at 1157-58, U 11.
On May 15, 1991, pursuant to the Writ of Execution, the Weber County Sheriff
conducted a sheriffs sale of the Ogden Property, at which Restaurant Store was the
highest bidder. See R. at 1157-57, ^f 11. The Weber County Sheriff therefore issued a
certificate of the sale to Restaurant Store, which was recorded with the Weber County
Recorder on June 3, 1993. See R. at 1144-45 % 6; R. at 1168.
On May 20, 1991, XM, which at the time was a general partnership owned jointly
by Mr. Gay and an individual named George Bybee, purchased the Ogden Property from
Restaurant Store. See R. at 1158 ^ 12. Although Restaurant Store did not execute a quit
claim deed to XM until June 3, 2003, see R. at 1158 ^| 13, XM has been the equitable and
beneficial owner of the Property since May 20, 1991. See R. at 1158 ^[ 12; see also R. at
29-30.

13

Liberty West's redemption period for the Ogden Property expired on November
15, 1991, six months after the execution sale at which Restaurant Store purchased the
property. See R. at 290 ^j 3. However, Liberty West's shareholders ultimately
determined not to redeem the Ogden Property. Among other factors affecting this
decision was the discovery of a major underground petroleum contamination from a
neighboring manufacturing plant. See R. at 1158 ^f 15.
In the late 1980s, Hogle was sued in another state for an unrelated debt owed to
Union National Bank of Chicago ("UNBC"), which obtained a monetary judgment
against him (the "Hogle Judgment"). See R. at 1157 ^f 8. UNBC's assets, including the
Hogle Judgment, were subsequently assumed by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation ("FDIC"). See R. at 1157 ^ 8. On February 20, 1991, Mr. Hogle executed a
security agreement in favor of the FDIC, in which he pledged his 2,500 shares of Liberty
West stock as collateral for the judgment. See R. at 1157, 2137. To perfect this security
interest, Mr. Hogle transferred possession of the Liberty West stock to the FDIC. On
November 21, 1990, Mr. Gay, then-president of Liberty West, sent the unendorsed Hogle
Shares certificates to the FDIC together with another document signed by Hogle entitled
"Irrevocable Stock or Bond Power" confirming the FDIC's security interest in the Hogle
Shares. See R. at 1157 ^ 9.
On November 22, 1991, Aurora, whose primary business is acquiring assets from
the FDIC, the Resolution Trust Corporation and other financial institutions for collection,
see R. at 356, purchased a package of assets, which included the Hogle Judgment, from
the FDIC at a judgment auction. See R. at 74 ^f 6. However, Aurora did not become a
14

shareholder of Liberty West until April, 1993, when it foreclosed on the Liberty West
stock. SeeR. at 290 H 5.
In 1993, nearly two years after the 1991 foreclosure sale, Aurora purported to
foreclose on its security interest in the Liberty West stock. At approximately the same
time, Aurora somehow developed an after-the-fact belief that the 1991 foreclosure was
improper. Aurora filed suit against Defendants in 1994 based upon this ill-conceived
theory. See R. at 1-10.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Aurora's appeal arises from the trial court's award of $1,785.02 in costs to
Defendants for expenses they incurred in connection with the trial court proceedings.
According to Aurora, the trial court's award was improper because Defendants'
memorandum of costs was untimely under Rule 54. Further, even though Defendants
prevailed on the issue below, Aurora claims that the trial court erred by failing to impose
Rule 11 sanctions against Defendants for their allegedly untimely request for costs, which
Aurora contends was in bad faith. Finally, Aurora asks this Court to enter sanctions
against Defendants pursuant to Rules 33 and 40 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Aurora's arguments are without merit.
First, the trial court's award of costs should be affirmed because it was based upon
a reasonable and correct interpretation of Rule 54(d). Although the language of Rule
54(d)(2) indicates that a memorandum of costs should be filed "within five days after the

Aurora does not challenge the amount of the award. Instead, Aurora claims solely that
the award was improper under Rule 54(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
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entry of judgment," the language of Rule 54(d)(1) calls into question the applicability of
this requirement in cases where an appeal has been filed. Recent case law supports this
interpretation.
Second, the trial court correctly determined that no Rule 11 violation occurred,
and therefore appropriately declined to impose sanctions against Defendants.
Defendants' arguments in support of the request for costs meritorious, and the arguments
were accepted by the trial court. Sanctions are inappropriate for this reason alone.
Finally, because Aurora is the party that filed this appeal, not Defendants, there is
also no basis for sanctions under Rules 33 or 40, which by their plain terms are
inapplicable to this case. In addition, the Court should not award sanctions because
Defendants' arguments are not frivolous or brought for any improper purpose.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE AWARD OF TRIAL COURT COSTS TO DEFENDANTS WAS
PROPER UNDER RULE 54(d) AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE
AFFIRMED
The trial court's award to Defendants of their costs incurred in connection with the

proceedings below was correct under a reasonable and appropriate interpretation of Rule
54(d). As such, Aurora's arguments should be rejected, and the trial court's award
should be affirmed.
A.

Defendants' Reading of Rule 54(d) Harmonizes Its Subsections and Is
Supported by Case Law

Aurora contends that Rule 54(d)(2) unvaryingly requires a party entitled to trial
court costs to file a memorandum of costs within five days from "entry of final
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judgment." Appellant's Br. at 5. Aurora further claims that the only judgment to which
this language may apply is the "judgment" from which an appeal may be taken, even if
there remain outstanding issues for determination. While Aurora's reading of the rule
may apply in certain circumstances, Aurora fails to account for situations involving
appeals, and its interpretation fails to harmonize the two subsections of Rule 54(d).
The trial court properly interpreted Rule 54(d) as a whole, reading subsections
(1) and (2) so as to harmonize their application in cases involving appeals. Specifically,
while Rule 54(d)(2) states that a prevailing party must serve and file a memorandum of
costs "within five days after the entry of judgment," Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2), Rule
54(d)(1) strongly indicates that, when the losing party commences an appeal, the
"judgment" does not become "final" for purposes of awarding costs until after the appeal
is concluded. In particular, Rule 54(d)(1) signifies that "final determination" of a case
will not occur until after the conclusion an appeal, at which time costs shall be awarded:
[C]osts shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court
otherwise directs; provided, however, where an appeal or other proceeding
for review is taken, costs of the action, other than costs in connection with
such appeal or other proceeding for review, shall abide the final
determination of the cause.
Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1) (emphasis added). Read in conjunction with Rule 54(d)(2), Rule
54(d)(1) indicates that, in cases where an appeal is taken, the judgment from which an
award of costs is made is not entered until after the appeal. Under this reasonable and
appropriate interpretation of Rule 54(d), the trial court's award of costs to Defendants
was correct and should be affirmed. Case law from other jurisdictions supports this
interpretation. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Horkheimer, 901 So.2d 329,
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331 (holding that time for filing application for attorney fees and costs began to run upon
entry of "new final judgment upon remand"); see also Litty v Becker, 656 A.2d 365, 369
(Md. App. 1995) (stating that, in the absence of a strict time requirement for filing a
request for costs, "it may often be prudent for a party to delay filing such a motion until
the appeal has been concluded, to avoid presenting an issue that need no longer be
decided" (emphasis added)).
Moreover, whether or not a "judgment" triggering the five-day period had been
entered prior to the appeal, the trial court's entry of discovery sanctions on Aurora made
it clear that Defendants were the prevailing parties below. As such, costs were to be
awarded to Defendants "as a matter of course," Utah R. Civ. Proc. 54(d)(1), leaving only
the amount of the award for a subsequent determination. To the extent the five-day
requirement for a memorandum of costs is intended to serve the purpose of notifying the
opposing party that costs would be sought, the memorandum of costs was therefore a
non-issue. See Chamizo v. Forman, 933 So.2d 1240, 1241 (Fla. App. 2006); accord
Hinson v. Holt, 776 So.2d 804, 813 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998) ("Because *[t]he assessment of
costs is merely incidental to the judgment and may be done at any time prior to issuance
of execution, we conclude that a motion for costs pursuant to Rule 54(d), Ala. R. Civ. P.,
may properly be ruled upon by the trial court at any time before the issuance of
execution, regardless of the pendency of an appeal." (citation omitted)).
In Chamizo, the judgment at issue expressly provided that the prevailing party
would be awarded costs and attorney fees, leaving the determination of the amount for a
later date. See id. at 1240-41. However, as in this case, the prevailing party did not file a
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memorandum of costs until after the thirty-day period applicable under the Florida rules
had expired. Because it was a foregone conclusion that the prevailing party would, in
fact, receive an award of fees - as it was in this case - the appellate court properly ruled
that the timeliness of the memorandum of costs was a "non-issue." Id. at 1241. This
Court should do the same. Aurora was on notice by the plain terms of Rule 54(d)(1) that
Defendants were entitled to costs. Defendants' filing of the memorandum of costs
following the appeal and the trial court's entry of the Final Judgment was timely, and
Aurora suffered no prejudice as a result.
Because the trial court properly awarded costs to Defendants under a reasonable
interpretation of Rule 54(d), its award of costs should be affirmed.
B.

The Utah Cases Relied Upon by Aurora Are Distinguishable, and the
Question Presented Here Is a Matter of First Impression

Despite the fact that Utah case law generally interprets Rule 54(d)(2) to require a
memorandum of costs to be filed within five days of a "judgment" entered prior to an
appeal, no Utah court has addressed the fact pattern in this case, where a Final Judgment
was entered and a memorandum of costs was filed after the appeal was concluded.
Accordingly, the cases relied upon by Aurora are distinguishable.
For example, Defendants acknowledge that the primary case relied upon by
Aurora, Lyon v. Burton, 2000 UT 19, 5 P.3d 616, suggests there are no circumstances in
which a prevailing party who fails to file a memorandum of costs within five days of the
entry of "judgment" can ever obtain costs. See id. ^j 77-78. However, unlike in Lyon,
where the trial court definitively entered a "judgment" on a date certain, see id. ]f 77, and
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unlike cases in which a party obtains a judgment for damages or some other form of
affirmative relief, in this case there was no judgment per se - there was an order entering
the discovery sanctions of (1) striking Aurora's complaint and (2) precluding Aurora
from using any evidence related to the discovery it failed to produce to XM. See R. at
3276. This Order was followed by another order denying one of Aurora's many motions
to "alter or amend" the discovery sanction Order. See R. at 3328-29.
Further, whereas in Lyon the prevailing party filed its memorandum of costs
approximately sixteen days after the trial court's judgment, but still prior to the appeal,
see Lyon, 2000 UT 19, \ 11, in this case Defendants filed their memorandum after the
conclusion of the appeal. The same is true of the other Utah cases cited by Aurora. See,
e.g., Brown v. Jorgensen, 2006 UT 168, \ 27, 136 P.3d 1252 (reversing costs award
where there was no memorandum of costs was filed); Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. New
York Terminal Warehouse Co., 350 P.2d 626, 629 (Utah 1960) (reversing award of costs
where prevailing party submitted timely unverified memorandum of costs, but unverified
memorandum was filed several days after expiration of five-day deadline); In re Sheville,
2003 UT App 141, f 2 & n.2, 71 P.3d 179 (reversing costs award where memorandum of
costs was filed approximately a month after order of guardianship was entered); see also
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 318 (Utah 1998) (holding that costs award was
improper where memorandum of costs was filed nineteen days after entry of judgment).5

5

In another case relied upon by Aurora, Ault v. Holden, 2002 UT 33, 44 P.3d 781, the
costs award was reversed because the judgment was reversed, so the party who prevailed
below was no longer entitled to costs as the "prevailing party." Id., 2002 UT 33,fflf4648. Thus, the issue here was also not considered by the court in Ault.
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Thus, unlike in this case, in the cases relied upon by Aurora, there was no dispute about
whether a "final judgment" - or, in the language of Rule 54(d)(1), a "final determination"
- had been entered, and the issue was therefore not before those courts.
Indeed, only one Utah case has addressed the language of Rule 54(d)(1) at issue
here, i.e., "costs of the action . . . shall abide the final determination of the cause," Utah
R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1), and it supports Defendants' interpretation. See Benjamin v. Arnica
Mut. Ins. Co., 2006 UT 37,ffif38-39, 140 P.3d 1210. In Benjamin, the Supreme Court
addressed an interlocutory appeal from a grant of summary judgment requiring the
defendant insurer to defend and indemnify the plaintiff in a lawsuit filed against him by
two coworkers. See id.fflf1-2. Considering the insurance company's request for costs on
appeal, the Supreme Court denied the request but instructed the trial court to evaluate the
issue "when the case is finally resolved and it can identify the prevailing party." Id. % 39
(emphasis added). The Supreme Court explained:
This is an interlocutory appeal; final judgment has yet to be entered. Under
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1), an award of costs is to be given to
the "prevailing party" and is to "abide the final determination of the cause."
In interpreting this provision, we embrace the rule promulgated by the
Arizona Supreme Court: "Unless provided by statute, there shall be no
application for costs or attorneys' fees made in connection with a petition
for review by interlocutory appeal. [I]ssues of costs and attorneys fees, if
any, shall abide the final resolution of the adjudication."
Benjamin, 2006 UT 37, % 39 (quoting In Re Rights to the Use of the Gila River, 830 P.2d
443, 458 (Ariz. 1992)).
Although this case does not involve an interlocutory appeal, the Benjamin court's
reasoning is applicable - because no "final determination" had been entered prior to the
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appeal, a memorandum of costs was not required until after the case was remitted and the
Final Judgment was entered. Indeed, the portion of the Order appealed from in this case
sanctioned Aurora both by dismissing its claims and by precluding it from relying upon
certain evidence at trial, see R. at 3276, strongly suggesting that post-appeal proceedings
were within the contemplation of both the trial court and the parties.
Moreover, in this case the Court of Appeals specifically remitted the case back to
the trial court and, consistent with Benjamin, Defendants then requested the trial court to
"finally determine" the case by entry of a final judgment. At the same time, Defendants
asked the trial court to include in that judgment its costs on appeal, which were awarded
by this Court, but the amount of which was to be determined by the trial court. This is
precisely the type of award and "final determination" contemplated by Rule 54(d)(1).
Because the trial court correctly awarded costs to Defendants, the judgment in this
matter should be affirmed.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DECLINED TO IMPOSE RULE 11
SANCTIONS AGAINST DEFENDANTS
According to Aurora, the trial court erred by refusing to impose sanctions against

Defendants under Rule 11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Aurora's argument should be
rejected for numerous reasons.
A,

The Trial Court Correctly Determined that No Rule 11 Violation
Occurred

Aurora contends that Defendants violated Rule 11(b)(2) because they improperly
certified to the court that their arguments "were warranted by existing law or by a
nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law, or the
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establishment of new law." Utah R. Civ. Proc. 11(b)(2). To the contrary, as set forth
above, Defendants reasonably believed, based upon a reasonable investigation, that their
claim for costs was "warranted by existing law." Based upon the language of Rule
54(d)(1), Defendants concluded that a final judgment had yet to be entered after the
appeal was remitted, as awards for both trial court costs and appellate costs remained for
disposition. If the trial court found Defendants arguments sufficiently reasoned and wellfounded to grant their request for costs, the arguments should certainly not be subject to
Rule 11 scrutiny.
Aurora also asserts that Defendants filed their motion for entry of a final judgment
in "bad faith," Appellant's Br. at 12, and that they did so in an attempt "to mislead the
trial court." Id. at 11. These assertions should be summarily rejected. As indicated
above, Defendants founded their arguments on the language of Rule 54(d) itself, and on
their understanding that a "final" judgment had not yet been entered. Aurora's assertion
that Defendants attempted to pull the wool over the trial court's eyes gives the trial court
too little credit. In short, the trial court correctly determined that no Rule 11 violation
occurred.
B.

The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Declining to Impose
Sanctions

The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to impose Rule 11
sanctions. Whether to impose sanctions is a matter within the trial court's discretion, see
Barnard v. Sutliff, 846 P.2d 1229, 1235 (Utah 1992), and the rule itself indicates that
sanctions are not always necessary. See Utah R. Civ. P. 11(c) ("If, after notice and a
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reasonable opportunity to respond, the court determines that subdivision (b) has been
violated, the Court may . . . impose an appropriate sanction . . . .") (emphasis added).
In this case, the alleged violation - even assuming there was one - was not
sufficiently severe to justify sanctions. "Factual errors or misstatements 'must be
significant'" to warrant Rule 11 sanctions. K.F.K. v. T. W., 2005 UT App 85, f 4, 110
P.3d 162 (quoting Morse v. Packer, 2000 UT 86,% 28, 15 P.3d 1021) (affirming trial
court's conclusion that party did not violate Rule 11). Defendants sought and received
$1,785.02 in costs. Defendants' arguments were made in good faith, were not made for
any improper purpose, and Defendants had no intention to deceive anyone, let alone the
trial court. Sanctions are an unusual remedy reserved for egregious situations. See, e.g.,
Pennington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 973 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1998) (affirming award of
$15,000 in attorney fees as Rule 11 sanction for knowingly filing complaint including
excessive medical fees for purpose of forcing payment excessive attorney fees); In re
Adoption of R.N.I, 913 P.2d 761, 764-65 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (affirming award of
attorney fees where attorney petitioned court for adoption knowing biological mother had
challenged consent and without inquiring as to whether biological father would have
consented to adoption); cf Morse v. Packer, 2000 UT 86, Tf 28, 15 P.3d 1021
("[Sanctions will not be imposed when they are not critical and the surrounding
circumstances indicate that counsel did conduct a reasonable inquiry."). No sanction is
warranted here as Aurora has failed to make any showing that Defendants engaged in any
egregious conduct or otherwise acted improperly.
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In short, the trial court's determination that no Rule 11 violation occurred should
be affirmed, as should its determination that Rule 11 sanctions were not warranted.
III.

THIS COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS ON
APPEAL BECAUSE DOING SO WOULD BE PROCEDURALLY
IMPROPER, AND DEFENDANTS' ARGUMENTS ARE WELL-FOUNDED
Aurora asks this Court to sanction Defendants pursuant to Rules 33 and 40 of the

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. However, by its clear terms, Rule 33 permits
damages to be awarded only for "a motion made or appeal taken under these rules that is
either frivolous or for delay." Utah R. App. Proc. 33(a) (emphasis added). Defendants
have not made any motion nor have they taken an appeal under the Rules of Appellate
Procedure, so the rule is inapplicable on its face. Further, even if the rule were
applicable, none of the arguments presented by Defendants to the trial court or this Court
is frivolous, as discussed above, nor were any of Defendants' arguments made for the
purpose of delaying any proceedings. Sanctions are therefore unwarranted under Rule
33. See Beddoes v. Giffin, 2006 UT App 130, 2006 WL 929112, at * 1 (denying request
for sanctions under Rule 33 where appellant's arguments were liberally construed as
"good faith arguments for modification of existing case law").
With respect to Rule 40, there are also no grounds for the imposition of sanctions.
As with Rule 33, Defendants are simply responding to Aurora's appeal - they have not
made any unsupported motions, appeals or otherwise taken any improper action under the
Rules of Appellate Procedure. In addition, as discussed above, Defendants' positions are
reasonable and well-founded, and these positions were accepted by the trial court.
Defendants' counsel has provided adequate assistance and representation to Defendants,
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has not "engaged in conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar/' and has not violated any
rule or order of the Court. See Utah R. App. Proc. 40(b). As such, Aurora's request for
sanctions should be denied.6
CONCLUSION
For all of the reasons set forth above, Defendants respectfully ask the Court to
affirm the award of trial court costs and the trial court's refusal to enter Rule 11 sanctions
in this matter. Defendants further request the Court to deny Aurora's request for
sanctions on appeal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 26th day of March 2007.
MAGLEBY & GREENWOOD, P.C.

rc~—s-*^
James E. Magleby
Christine T. Greenwood
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellees Liberty
West Development, Inc., XM International, and
Dennis W. Gay

6

Defendants note that Aurora did not provide any notice of its intent to seek sanctions
prior to commencing this appeal. Nevertheless, if the Court sees fit to consider the
imposition of sanctions on Defendants or their counsel, Defendants hereby request a
hearing on the issue in accordance with Rule 40(b).
26

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 26th day of March 2007,1 caused to be mailed, by
United States first-class mail, two true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF
APPELLEES LIBERTY WEST DEVELOPMENT, INC., XM INTERNATIONAL
AND DENNIS W. GAY to the following:
Eric P. Hartman, Esq.
2558 South Wilshire Circle
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
Attorney for Appellant Aurora
Credit Services, Inc.
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ADDENDUM

Tab A

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 11. Signing of pleadings, motions, and other papers; representations to
court; sanctions.
(a) Signature. Every pleading, written motion, and other paper shall be signed by at
least one attorney of record in the attorney's individual name, or, if the party is not
represented by an attorney, shall be signed by the party. Each paper shall state the
signer's address and telephone number, if any. Except when otherwise specifically
provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit.
An unsigned paper shall be stricken unless omission of the signature is corrected
promptly after being called to the attention of the attorney or party.
(b) Representations to court. By presenting a pleading, written motion, or other paper to
the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating), an attorney or
unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge, information,
and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances,
(b)(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation;
(b)(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by
existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law or the establishment of new law;
(b)(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if
specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable
opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and
(b)(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically
so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or belief.
(c) Sanctions. If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court
determines that subdivision (b) has been violated, the court may, subject to the
conditions stated below, impose an appropriate sanction upon the attorneys, law firms,
or parties that have violated subdivision (b) or are responsible for the violation.
(c)(1) How initiated.
(c)(1)(A) By motion. A motion for sanctions under this rule shall be made separately
from other motions or requests and shall describe the specific conduct alleged to violate
subdivision (b). It shall be served as provided in Rule 5, but shall not be filed with or
presented to the court unless, within 21 days after service of the motion (or such other
period as the court may prescribe), the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention,
allegation, or denial is not withdrawn or appropriately corrected. If warranted, the court
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may award to the party prevailing on the motion the reasonable expenses and attorney
fees incurred in presenting or opposing the motion. In appropriate circumstances, a law
firm may be held jointly responsible for violations committed by its partners, members,
and employees.
(c)(1)(B) On court's initiative. On its own initiative, the court may enter an order
describing the specific conduct that appears to violate subdivision (b) and directing an
attorney, law firm, or party to show cause why it has not violated subdivision (b) with
respect thereto.
(c)(2) Nature of sanction; limitations. A sanction imposed for violation of this rule shall
be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct
by others similarly situated. Subject to the limitations in subparagraphs (A) and (B), the
sanction may consist of, or include, directives of a nonmonetary nature, an order to pay
a penalty into court, or, if imposed on motion and warranted for effective deterrence, an
order directing payment to the movant of some or all of the reasonable attorney fees
and other expenses incurred as a direct result of the violation.
(c)(2)(A) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded against a represented party for a
violation of subdivision (b)(2).
(c)(2)(B) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded on the court's initiative unless the
court issues its order to show cause before a voluntary dismissal or settlement of the
claims made by or against the party which is, or whose attorneys are, to be sanctioned.
(c)(2)(3) Order. When imposing sanctions, the court shall describe the conduct
determined to constitute a violation of this rule and explain the basis for the sanction
imposed.
(d) Inapplicability to discovery. Subdivisions (a) through (c) of this rule do not apply to
disclosures and discovery requests, responses, objections, and motions that are subject
to the provisions of Rules 26 through 37.

Rule 54. Judgments; costs.
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree and any order
from which an appeal lies. A judgment need not contain a recital of pleadings, the report
of a master, or the record of prior proceedings. Judgments shall state whether they are
entered upon trial, stipulation, motion or the court's initiative; and, unless otherwise
directed by the court, a judgment shall not include any matter by reference.
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple parties. When more than
one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross
claim, or third party claim, and/or when multiple parties are involved, the court may
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direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or
parties only upon an express determination by the court that there is no just reason for
delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such
determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated,
that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the
parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or
other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment
adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.
(c) Demand for judgment.
(c)(1) Generally. Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by default,
every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered
is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings. It may be
given for or against one or more of several claimants; and it may, when the justice of the
case requires it, determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each side as between or
among themselves.
(c)(2) Judgment by default. A judgment by default shall not be different in kind from, or
exceed in amount, that specifically prayed for in the demand for judgment.
(d) Costs.
(d)(1) To whom awarded. Except when express provision therefor is made either in a
statute of this state or in these rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to the
prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs; provided, however, where an appeal
or other proceeding for review is taken, costs of the action, other than costs in
connection with such appeal or other proceeding for review, shall abide the final
determination of the cause. Costs against the state of Utah, its officers and agencies
shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law.
(d)(2) How assessed. The party who claims his costs must within five days after the
entry of judgment serve upon the adverse party against whom costs are claimed, a copy
of a memorandum of the items of his costs and necessary disbursements in the action,
and file with the court a like memorandum thereof duly verified stating that to affiant's
knowledge the items are correct, and that the disbursements have been necessarily
incurred in the action or proceeding. A party dissatisfied with the costs claimed may,
within seven days after service of the memorandum of costs, file a motion to have the
bill of costs taxed by the court.
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or at the time of or
subsequent to the service and filing of the findings of fact and conclusions of law, but
before the entry of judgment, shall nevertheless be considered as served and filed on
the date judgment is entered.
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(e) Interest and costs to be included in the judgment The clerk must include in any
judgment signed by him any interest on the verdict or decision from the time it was
rendered, and the costs, if the same have been taxed or ascertained. The clerk must,
within two days after the costs have been taxed or ascertained, in any case where not
included in the judgment, insert the amount thereof in a blank left in the judgment for
that purpose, and make a similar notation thereof in the register of actions and in the
judgment docket.

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
Rule 33. Damages for delay or frivolous appeal; recovery of attorney's fees.
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Except in a first appeal of right in a criminal
case, if the court determines that a motion made or appeal taken under these rules is
either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just damages, which may include single or
double costs, as defined in Rule 34, and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing
party. The court may order that the damages be paid by the party or by the party's
attorney.
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal, motion, brief, or
other paper is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not
based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law. An appeal,
motion, brief, or other paper interposed for the purpose of delay is one interposed for
any improper purpose such as to harass, cause needless increase in the cost of
litigation, or gain time that will benefit only the party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or
other paper.
(c) Procedures.
(1) The court may award damages upon request of any party or upon its own motion. A
party may request damages under this rule only as part of the appellee's motion for
summary disposition under Rule 10, as part of the appellee's brief, or as part of a party's
response to a motion or other paper.
(2) If the award of damages is upon the motion of the court, the court shall issue to the
party or the party's attorney or both an order to show cause why such damages should
not be awarded. The order to show cause shall set forth the allegations which form the
basis of the damages and permit at least ten days in which to respond unless otherwise
ordered for good cause shown. The order to show cause may be part of the notice of
oral argument.
(3) If requested by a party against whom damages may be awarded, the court shall
grant a hearing.
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Rule 40. Attorney's or party's certificate; sanctions and discipline.
(a) Attorney's or party's certificate. Every motion, brief, and other paper of a party
represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record who is an
active member in good standing of the Bar of this state. The attorney shall sign his or
her individual name and give his or her business address, telephone number, and Utah
State Bar number. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign any motion,
brief, or other paper and state the party's address and telephone number. Except when
otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, motions, briefs, or other papers need
not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. The signature of an attorney or party
constitutes a certificate that the attorney or party has read the motion, brief, or other
paper; that to the best of his or her knowledge, information, and belief, formed after
reasonable inquiry, it is not frivolous or interposed for the purpose of delay as defined in
Rule 33. If a motion, brief, or other paper is not signed as required by this rule, it shall
be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is called to the attention of the
attorney or party. If a motion, brief, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the
authority and the procedures of the court provided by Rule 33 shall apply.
(b) Sanctions and discipline of attorneys and parties. The court may, after reasonable
notice and an opportunity to show cause to the contrary, and upon hearing, if requested,
take appropriate action against any attorney or person who practices before it for
inadequate representation of a client, conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar or a
person allowed to appear before the court, or for failure to comply with these rules or
order of the court. Any action to suspend or disbar a member of the Utah State Bar shall
be referred to the Office of Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar.
(c) Rule does not affect contempt power. This rule shall not be construed to limit or
impair the court's inherent and statutory contempt powers.
(d) Appearance of counsel pro hac vice. An attorney who is licensed to practice before
the bar of another state or a foreign country but who is not a member of the Bar of this
state, may appear, pro hac vice upon motion, filed pursuant to the Code of Judicial
Administration. A separate motion is not required in the appellate court if the attorney
has previously been admitted pro hac vice in the lower tribunal, but the attorney shall
file in the appellate court a notice of appearance pro hac vice to that effect.
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TabB

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that on March 8, 2006/ a true and correct copy
of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States mail to
the parties listed below:
ERIC P HARTMAN
ATTORNEY AT LAW
2558 S WILSHIRE CIRCLE
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84109
JAMES E. MAGLEBY
CHRISTINE T GREENWOOD
MAGLEBY & GREENWOOD PC
170 S MAIN STE 350
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101
Dated this March 8, 2006.

Dep^fy Clerk
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Case No. 20041080
District Court No. 940904935

RECI
-iECFlVPi
FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

MAR 0 8 2006
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
--ooOooAurora Credit Services, Inc.,
a Minnesota corporation, on
behalf of itself and all other
shareholders of Liberty West
Deve1opment, a c orporatlon,

ORDER
Case No. 20041080-CA

Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Liberty West Development,
Inc., a Utah corporation; XM
International, a Utah limited
liability company; and Dennis
W, Gay, an individual,
Defendants and Appellees,

This matter is before the court upon Appellant's petition
for rehearing-, filed March 6, 2006.
Now, therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that trie petition for
rehearing is denied.
Dated nhis _Q__ day of March, 2006.
FOR THE COURT:

Carolyn B, McHugh, Judg<L^

